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THE JUDICIAL DUTY TO SCRUTINIZE 
LEGISLATION 
Randy E. Barnett* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Declaration of Independence famously declared, “[w]e hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.”1  It then 
affirmed “[t]hat to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted 
among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the 
Governed.”2  This last sentence has proven to be problematic. 
If “consent of the governed” means the consent of a majority of “We 
the people,” then the “consent of the governed” can be used to violate 
the unalienable rights for which “Governments are instituted among 
Men.”3  The situation is still worse if the consent of a majority of a small 
body of men and women called “legislators” and “representatives” is 
taken to be the same as the consent of the people themselves.4  The 
problem with the prevailing “collective” conception of popular 
sovereignty is that it invites this majoritarian interpretation of the 
“consent of the governed.”5  How else is the “will” of “We the people” to 
be identified? 
In my book, Restoring the Lost Constitution, I addressed this tension 
by identifying what I called “The Fiction of ‘We the People.’”6  By this I 
mean it is fiction to claim that laws passed pursuant to the Constitution 
are binding in conscience on the individual because “We the People” 
have consented to be so bound.  The basic problem with this claim is the 
fundamental proposition that no one can by her own consent bind 
someone else.  For example, two people cannot by their consent oblige a 
                                                 
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center; 
Director, Georgetown Center for the Constitution.  This Essay was prepared as the basis of 
the Seegers Lecture in Jurisprudence given at the Valparaiso University Law School, on 
October 3, 2013.  I thank my research assistant Jason Kestecher for his comments on an 
earlier draft.  Permission to copy and distribute for educational use is hereby granted. 
1 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
2 Id. 
3 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
14 (2d ed. 2014); see THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 1, at para. 2 (stating 
that “Governments are instituted among Men”). 
4 See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 14–15 (explaining the issues with equating voting to 
consent). 
5 See id. at 14–31 (identifying the problems with the collective consent of “We the 
People”). 
6 Id. at 11. 
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third person to part with her money or her bodily integrity.  For a person 
to be bound by consent, she must be the one who consents. 
Yet we are told that because some subset of a group of people 
residing in North America a couple hundred years ago can be said to 
have consented to be bound by a government formed by the 
Constitution of the United States, then this consent bound dissenters 
back in 1789 and each successive generation, including ours.  In my 
book, I explain why each of the arguments that are commonly offered on 
behalf of this claim fails upon close examination.7  For this reason, it is 
fair to read my book as rejecting what may be called either “popular 
sovereignty” or the “consent of the governed” as the basis for the 
legitimacy of the Constitution. 
Instead, I contend that a constitution to which everyone does not 
consent could still be legitimate if it establishes procedures that make it 
more likely than not that the laws being imposed on nonconsenting 
persons are proper and necessary insofar as, first, these laws do not 
improperly violate the rights of these nonconsenting persons and, 
second, these laws are necessary to protect the rights of others.8  If both 
of these conditions are met, laws produced by such a system can bind in 
conscience so that there may exist a prima facie duty of obedience 
notwithstanding the absence of actual consent. 
However, since the first edition of the book appeared ten years ago, I 
have become aware of another more individualist conception of popular 
sovereignty that existed at the time of the founding but which is 
generally neglected.  This conception does not rest on the collective 
consent of a body of people—which in practice means consent by a 
majority of those who are allowed to vote—but is instead based on the 
individual sovereignty of each person.  This individualist conception of 
popular sovereignty was most strikingly presented in the first great 
constitutional case:  Chisholm v. Georgia decided by the Supreme Court in 
1793, just four years after the enactment of the Constitution.9 
II.  INDIVIDUAL POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY10 
In Chisholm, the Supreme Court, by a vote of four to one, rejected 
Georgia’s assertion of sovereign immunity as a defense against a suit in 
federal court for breach of contract brought against it by an individual 
                                                 
7 See id. at 14–25 (discrediting arguments that support the “consent of the governed”). 
8 Id. at 44–45. 
9 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
10 This Part is based on a lengthier description of Chief Justice Jay’s and Justice Wilson’s 
opinions, which I presented in Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State?:  Chisholm v. 
Georgia and Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1730–34 (2007). 
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citizen of another state.11  Instead, the Court concluded that if the 
concept of “sovereignty” is even applicable—the term is nowhere used 
in the Constitution—sovereignty rests with the people rather than with 
state governments.  This decision is inconsistent with both the modern 
claims that democratically elected legislatures exercise the sovereign will 
of the people and that states are entitled to the same immunity as was 
enjoyed by the King of England.  The Justices in Chisholm affirmed that, 
in America, the states are not kings, and their legislatures are not the 
supreme successors to the Crown.  
To reach this holding, the Court interpreted the meaning of Article 
III, Section 2, which specifies that “[t]he judicial power [of the United 
States] shall extend to . . . Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens 
of another State.”12  This section seems to authorize a suit for breach of 
contract against Georgia (“a state”) brought by a citizen of South 
Carolina (“another state”).  But Georgia contended that this text was 
qualified by the extra-textual doctrine of sovereign immunity; despite 
Article III’s apparent plain meaning, no suit could be brought against it 
by a citizen of another state without its consent.13 
Because each Justice delivered his own opinion “seriatim,” there was 
no opinion of the Court.  Justice James Wilson, a member of the 
Committee of Detail that produced the first draft of the Constitution, 
began his opinion by stressing that the Constitution nowhere uses the 
term “sovereignty.”14  He stated:  “To the Constitution of the United 
States the term Sovereign, is totally unknown.”15  There was only one 
place in the Constitution “where it could have been used with 
propriety,” he observed, referring to the Preamble.16  “But, even in that 
place it would not, perhaps, have comported with the delicacy of those, 
who ordained and established that Constitution.  They might have 
announced themselves ‘Sovereign’ people of the United States:  But 
serenely conscious of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious 
declaration.”17 
                                                 
11 John V. Orth, The Truth About Justice Iredell’s Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 73 
N.C. L. REV. 255, 256 (1994). 
12 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 466 (opinion of Wilson, J.) 
(interpreting the language of Article III, Section 2). 
13 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 476 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (providing Georgia’s 
contention that Article III, Section 2 only applies to cases involving a state as a plaintiff). 
14 Id. at 454 (opinion of Wilson, J.); Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing 
Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 233 n.342 (2012). 
15 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 454 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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Wilson then identified three possible alternative meanings of the 
term “sovereign.”  First, “the term sovereign, has for its correlative, 
subject.  In this sense, the term can receive no application; for it has no 
object in the Constitution of the United States.  Under that Constitution 
there are citizens, but no subjects.”18  Indeed, Wilson noted that the 
“term, subject, occurs . . . once in the instrument; but to mark the contrast 
strongly, the epithet ‘foreign’ is prefixed.”19 
Wilson rejected the concept of “subject” as inapplicable to states 
because he knew “the Government of that State to be republican; and my 
short definition of such a Government is,—one constructed on this 
principle, that the Supreme Power resides in the body of the people.”20  
Furthermore: 
the citizens of Georgia, when they acted upon the large 
scale of the Union, as a part of the “People of the United 
States,” did not surrender the Supreme or sovereign 
Power to that State; but, as to the purposes of the Union, 
retained it to themselves. As to the purposes of the 
Union, therefore, Georgia is NOT a sovereign State.21 
In other words, according to Justice Wilson, to the extent one wishes to 
use the word “sovereignty” at all, sovereignty lies in the people 
themselves, not in any government formed by the people. 
Wilson then considered a second sense of sovereignty relating to the 
feudal power of English kings: 
Into England this system was introduced by the 
conqueror:  and to this era we may, probably, refer the 
English maxim, that the King or sovereign is the 
fountain of Justice. . . . With regard to him, there was no 
superior power; and, consequently, on feudal principles, 
no right of jurisdiction.22 
Wilson characterized this as “only a branch of a much more extensive 
principle, on which a plan of systematic despotism has been lately 
formed in England, and prosecuted with unwearied assiduity and 
care.”23 
                                                 
18 Id. at 456. 
19 Id. (footnote omitted). 
20 Id. at 457. 
21 Id. 
22 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall) at 458 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
23 Id. 
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Wilson rejected this feudal notion of sovereignty as inconsistent with 
“another principle, very different in its nature and operations [that] 
forms . . . the basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence.”24  This is the 
principle that “laws derived from the pure source of equality and justice 
must be founded on the Consent of those, whose obedience they require.  
The sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found in the man.”25  
In other words, obedience must rest on the consent of the only 
“sovereign” from which justice and equality rest:  the individual person 
who is asked to obey the law.  Wilson believed that the only reason “a 
free man is bound by human laws, is, that he binds himself.  Upon the 
same principles, upon which he becomes bound by the laws, he becomes 
amenable to the Courts of Justice, which are formed and authori[z]ed by 
those laws.”26 
Just as individuals are subject to the jurisdiction of courts, so too are 
state governments, which are merely the very same people who have 
banded together to form a government.  Therefore, states are no less 
bound by the law than are the ultimate sovereign individuals that 
established them.  “If one free man, an original sovereign,” may bind 
himself to the jurisdiction of the court, “why may not an aggregate of 
free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this likewise?  If the dignity 
of each singly is undiminished; the dignity of all jointly must be 
unimpaired.”27 
For Wilson the situation posed by the case was simple:  “A State, like 
a merchant, makes a contract.  A dishonest State, like a dishonest 
merchant, wilfully refuses to discharge it.”28  If the dishonest merchant 
“is amenable to a Court of Justice,” then “[u]pon general principles of 
right” shall the dishonest state “when summoned to answer the fair 
demands of its creditor, be permitted, proteus-like, to assume a new 
appearance, and to insult him and justice, by declaring I am a Sovereign 
State?  Surely not.”29 
That Justice Wilson was the author of this opinion is significant.  
James Wilson was as crucial a member of the Constitutional Convention 
as any other, including James Madison with whom Wilson worked 
closely during the convention debates.30  Unlike Madison, Wilson served 
                                                 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 456. 
27 Id. (emphasis added). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the Federal Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 as a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 80 GEO. WASH. 
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on the Committee of Detail that drafted the text of the Constitution.31  
His defense of the Constitution in the Pennsylvania ratification 
convention was lengthy and influential, and that state’s early ratification 
set the stage for the Constitution’s eventual adoption in other key 
states.32  Wilson was also among the most theoretically sophisticated of 
the Founders, as demonstrated by the lectures on law he delivered from 
1790 to 1792 in Philadelphia as the first law professor of the University of 
Pennsylvania (then the College of Philadelphia).33 
Justice Wilson was not alone in locating sovereignty in the 
individual person.  In his opinion in Chisholm, Chief Justice John Jay—
who, with Madison and Hamilton, had authored some of the early 
Federalist Papers—referred tellingly to “the joint and equal sovereigns of 
this country.”34  Jay affirmed the “great and glorious principle, that the 
people are the sovereign of this country, and consequently that fellow 
citizens and joint sovereigns cannot be degraded by appearing with each 
other in their own Courts to have their controversies determined.”35  
Denying individuals a right to sue a state, while allowing them to sue 
municipalities, “would not correspond with the equal rights we claim; 
with the equality we profess to admire and maintain, and with that 
popular sovereignty in which every citizen partakes.”36 
Neither Wilson nor Jay’s individualist conception of popular 
sovereignty conforms with the modern notion of popular sovereignty as 
a purely “collective” concept.  Professor Elizabeth Price Foley captures 
the individualist concept of popular sovereignty by calling it “residual 
individual sovereignty.”37  Their opinions in Chisholm present the radical 
yet fundamental idea that if anyone is sovereign, it is “We the People” as 
individuals, in contrast with the modern view that locates popular 
sovereignty in Congress or state legislatures, which supposedly 
                                                                                                             
L. REV. 1707, 1714 (2012) (listing James Madison and James Wilson as the two main 
visionaries during the Constitutional Convention. 
31 Id. at 1720.  This wording was later revised by a separate Committee of Style and 
Arrangement.  Id. at 1721. 
32 Ratifying a week after Delaware, Pennsylvania was just the second state—and the first 
large one—to ratify the Constitution.  See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION:  THE PEOPLE 
DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 97–124 (2010) (discussing the Pennsylvania 
convention and Wilson’s role). 
33 See MARK DAVID HALL, THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WILSON 
1742–1798, at 27–29 (1997) (describing the importance of Wilson’s lectures on law). 
34 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 477 (opinion of Jay, C.J.); Aaron Zelinsky, Misunderstanding 
the Anti-Federalist Papers:  The Dangers of Availability, 63 ALA. L. REV. 1067, 1071 (2012). 
35 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 479 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (emphasis added). 
36 Id. at 472–73 (emphases added). 
37 ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, LIBERTY FOR ALL:  RECLAIMING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN A NEW 
ERA OF PUBLIC MORALITY 42 (2006) (“[O]ne of the foundational principles of American 
law—at both the state and federal level—is residual individual sovereignty. . . .”). 
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represent the “will of the people,” or in a majority of the citizenry, rather 
than residing sovereignty in the citizenry as a whole. 
The Court’s decision in Chisholm was eventually reversed by the 
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment that reads:  “The Judicial power of 
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”38  A robust judicial and academic debate has arisen as to whether 
the Eleventh Amendment represents a repudiation of the Court’s 
incorrect interpretation of the Constitution, or a change in the meaning 
of the Constitution that the Court had correctly interpreted as 
inconsistent with the sovereign immunity of states.39  For what it is 
worth, after the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, Chief Justice 
Marshall seemed to endorse the view that the Court had previously been 
correct in its reading of Article III.40  He stated:  “The Constitution, as 
passed, gave the courts of the United States jurisdiction in suits brought 
against individual States. . . . This feature is no longer found in the 
Constitution; but it aids in the construction of those clauses with which it 
was originally associated.”41 
I am not claiming that Wilson’s and Jay’s conception of individual 
popular sovereignty was the only conception of popular sovereignty 
present at the founding.  Nor am I claiming anything about the original 
meaning of the Constitution.  Instead, I offer it to make sense of an 
approach to the “consent of the governed” that also existed at the time of 
the founding—an approach that further supports the natural rights 
approach of constitutional legitimacy that I defend in my book.42  If it is 
the people as individuals who are sovereign, and the people as individuals 
retain their preexisting rights, as is affirmed in the text of the 
Constitution by the Ninth Amendment, then we are faced with the issue 
of what the people could have consented to.43  Put another way, to the 
                                                 
38 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
39 See Barnett, supra note 10, at 1741–55 (describing the debate and denying that the 
Eleventh Amendment represented the repudiation of the reasoning of Chisholm rather than 
the result). 
40 See infra text accompanying note 41 (quoting Chief Justice Marshall’s view on Article 
III). 
41 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810) (emphasis added). 
42 See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 84–85 (discussing natural rights and the duty to obey the 
law). 
43 See Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment:  It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2006) (“The purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to ensure that all individual natural 
rights had the same statute and force after some of them were enumerated as they had 
before . . . .”); see also Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty:  A Response to A 
Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938 (2008) 
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extent we care about the consent of the governed, we need to ask what 
each person could be said to have consented to in the absence of each 
person’s express consent. 
III.  PRESUMED CONSENT 
How then do we reconcile the individual conception of popular 
sovereignty based on each and every person’s consent with the fact that 
such unanimous consent to governance is never expressly solicited and 
would be impossible to obtain?  An answer to this question can be found 
at the time of the founding and long before that, similar to how the 
individual conception of popular sovereignty has been generally 
overlooked.  If we start with the proposition that it is the people as 
individuals who are sovereign and that they retain their preexisting 
rights unless they are expressly delegated to their agents, then in the 
absence of such express consent we must ask to what each person could be 
presumed to have consented. 
In his book, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, Lysander Spooner 
contended that, since the consent of the governed “exists only in theory,” 
the people cannot be presumed to have given up their preexisting 
rights.44  “Justice is evidently the only principle that everybody can be 
presumed to agree to, in the formation of government.”45  But Spooner 
was far from the first to make this argument, which crops up in some 
interesting places. 
John Locke, in his Second Treatise, observed that “Men when they 
enter into Society, give up the Equality, Liberty, and Executive Power 
they had in the State of Nature, into the hands of the Society, to be so far 
disposed of by the Legislative, as the good of the Society shall require.”46  
He then considered the scope of the legislative or police power that is 
given up, employing an analysis very similar to Spooner’s: 
[Y]et it being only with an intention in every one the 
better to preserve himself his Liberty and Property; (For 
no rational Creature can be supposed to change his 
condition with an intention to be worse) the power of 
                                                                                                             
(rejecting a “collectivist” interpretation of the “rights retained by the people” to which the 
Ninth Amendment refers). 
44 4 LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY, in THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF LYSANDER SPOONER 153 (1971) (“Our constitutions purport to be established by 
‘the people,’ and, in theory, ‘all the people’ consent to such government as the constitutions 
authorize.  But this consent of ‘the people’ exists only in theory.  It has no existence in 
fact.”). 
45 Id. at 143. 
46 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 353 (Peter Laslett ed., Student ed. 1988).  
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the Society, or Legislative constituted by them, can never 
be suppos’d to extend farther than the common good; but 
is obliged to secure every ones Property by providing 
against those three defects . . . that made the State of 
Nature so unsafe and uneasie.47 
Like Spooner, Locke asked, in the absence of any explicit consent, what a 
“rational Creature can be supposed” to have consented to when leaving 
the state of nature to enter civil society.  And the individual can only be 
supposed to have consented to the common good, which consists of the 
protection of each person’s life, liberty, and property. 
This idea of “supposed” or “presumed” consent appears again in 
Attorney General Edmund Randolph’s opinion on the constitutionality 
of a national bank.48  In addressing whether the power to incorporate a 
national bank is among the implied powers of Congress, Randolph 
observes that a legislature governed by a written constitution without an 
express “demarcation of powers, may, perhaps, be presumed to be left at 
large, as to all authority which is communicable by the people,” 
provided that such authority “does not affect any of those paramount 
rights, which a free people cannot be supposed to confide even to their 
representatives.”49  Once again, given the sovereignty of the people as 
individuals, the people cannot “be presumed” or “supposed” to have 
confided in their legislature any power to violate their fundamental 
rights.50 
Perhaps the most striking use of this notion of the presumed or 
supposed consent of the governed appears in the 1798 Supreme Court 
case of Calder v. Bull.51  Calder has become known for its clash between 
Justice Samuel Chase, who asserted “the great first principles of the 
social compact” that restrict the “rightful exercise of legislative 
authority,” and Justice James Iredell, who seemed to assert a far more 
unlimited conception of legislative power in the absence of any express 
                                                 
47 Id. (emphases added and omitted).  The “three defects” to which Locke refers are the 
absence of standing laws, the want of an effective power to protect one’s rights, and the 
lack of an independent and impartial magistrate to adjudicate disputes.  Id. at 351.  These 
three defects are ameliorated by the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of 
government.  Id. 
48 Edmund Randolph, Opinion of Edmund Randolph, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH 
AMERICA 86, 86 (Washington, Gales & Seaton, M. St. Clair Clarke & D. A. Hall eds., 1832). 
49 Id. (emphasis added). 
50 Id. 
51 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–89 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (discussing 
social compact and the power of the legislature). 
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constitutional limit.52  Generally overlooked is the fact that, like Locke, 
Randolph, and Spooner, Chase too employs the notion of supposed 
consent. 
Justice Chase begins by providing examples of laws that violate 
these “great first principles,” such as a law “that punished a citizen for 
an innocent action . . . ; a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful private 
contracts of citizens[;] a law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; 
or a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B.”53  He then 
contends that the enactment of such laws is beyond the legislative power 
because “[i]t is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a 
Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that 
they have done it.”54 
When discussing presumed or supposed consent, the issue is the 
relevant default rule.  For Chase in Calder, the legislature only has those 
powers that are expressly delegated, together with those implied powers 
that are not fundamentally unjust, such as punishing a person for acts 
that were legal when performed.55  This choice of default rules comes 
into play when the legislature is exercising implied powers rather than 
those that were expressly delegated.  Like Locke, Chase asked whether, 
in the absence of a clear statement in a written constitution, a free and 
rational person would have consented to that? 
Just seven years after Calder, in the case of United States v. Fisher, 
Chief Justice John Marshall adopted a similar clear statement rule with 
respect to presumed legislative intent:  “Where rights are infringed, 
where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system 
of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed 
with irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a design 
to effect such objects.”56 
To be sure, natural justice or natural rights lurk in the background of 
all these considerations of “presumed consent” but only as a way of 
interpreting the scope of legislative power in the absence of an express 
consent.  When combined with the concept of individual popular 
sovereignty, all these invocations of “presumed,” “supposed,” or 
“theoretical” consent cast the issue of popular sovereignty and the 
                                                 
52 Id. at 388 (emphasis omitted); cf. id. at 398–99 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (construing the 
legislature’s power more broadly). 
53 Id. at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis omitted). 
54 Id. (emphasis added). 
55 Id. at 387–88. 
56 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 [2015], Art. 11
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss3/11
2014] The Judicial Duty to Scrutinize Legislation 913 
“consent of the governed” in a new light that supports the approach to 
constitutional legitimacy I present in Restoring the Lost Constitution.57 
We can separate the steps of this argument as follows.  First, 
sovereignty rests not in the government, but in the people themselves 
considered as individuals.  Second, to be legitimate, the government 
must receive the consent of all these sovereign individuals.  Third, in the 
absence of an express consent by each person, however, the only consent 
that can be attributed to everyone is consent only to such powers that do 
not violate their retained fundamental rights.  Fourth, the effective 
protection of these rights retained by the people is what assures that the 
government is actually conforming to the consent that it claims to be the 
source of its just powers.  Finally, only if such protection is effective, 
does its commands bind the individual in conscience. 
IV.  JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT AND THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
Having discussed individual popular sovereignty and presumed 
consent, let me now turn to the final step in my analysis:  judicial 
engagement and the due process of law.  Let us begin by recalling the 
quote from John Locke above:  “[T]he power of the Society, or Legislative 
constituted by them, can never be suppos’d to extend farther than the 
common good; but is obliged to secure every ones Property by providing 
against those three defects . . . that made the State of Nature so unsafe 
and uneasie.”58  One of these three defects was the absence of an 
impartial magistrate: 
In the State of Nature there wants a known and 
indifferent judge, with Authority to determine all 
differences according to the established Law.  For every 
one in that state being both Judge and Executioner of the 
Law of Nature, Men being partial to themselves, Passion 
and Revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with 
too much heat, in their own Cases . . . .59 
No one who views popular sovereignty as residing in the individual 
would confuse the people themselves from their representatives in the 
legislature, who are but men and women who may use their power to 
                                                 
57 See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 52 (concluding that without consent, constitutional 
legitimacy is only present when there are sufficient procedures to assure that enacted laws 
are just). 
58 LOCKE, supra note 46, at 353 (emphasis added and omitted).  
59 Id. at 351 (emphasis omitted). 
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improperly restrict the liberties of the people.  As Madison explained in 
Federalist No. 10: 
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; 
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, 
and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.  With equal, 
nay with greater reason, a body of men, are unfit to be 
both judges and parties, at the same time; yet, what are 
many of the most important acts of legislation, but so 
many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the 
rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of 
large bodies of citizens; and what are the different 
classes of legislators, but advocates and parties to the 
causes which they determine?60 
According to Locke, the answer to this defect in the state of nature is 
the creation of an independent neutral judiciary.61  Or, as Madison put it 
in his speech proposing what became the Bill of Rights:  “independent 
tribunals of justice . . . will be an impenetrable bulwark against every 
assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be 
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly 
stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.”62 
Among these express guarantees is the Fifth Amendment that says 
that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”63  This due process of law includes an 
assessment by the independent judiciary that a particular statute was 
indeed a law within the powers that people may be presumed to have 
delegated to their agents. 
To get a sense of how this approach used to work in practice, we 
need not refer to the Supreme Court’s due process analysis in the 
controversial case of Lochner v. New York.64  Instead, we need look no 
farther back in history than the hallowed 1938 case of United States v. 
Carolene Products Co. in which Justice Stone reaffirmed “that a statute 
would deny due process which precluded the disproof in judicial 
proceedings of all facts which would show or tend to show that a statute 
                                                 
60 James Madison, Ten, in ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE 
FEDERALIST 48, 50 (J. R. Pole ed., 2005). 
61 LOCKE, supra note 46, at 353. 
62 See 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1031 (Leon 
Friedman & Karyn Gullen Browne eds., 1971) (outlining James Madison’s Speech before 
the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789). 
63 U.S. CONST. amend V. 
64 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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depriving the suitor of life, liberty or property had a rational basis.”65  He 
then elaborated that: 
Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation 
whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts 
beyond the sphere of judicial notice, such facts may 
properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry, and the 
constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the 
existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged 
by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to 
exist.66 
Of course, in Carolene Products, the Court found that Congress did 
have a factually rational basis for prohibiting the interstate trade in filled 
milk.67  Filled milk is made by skimming the butter fat from whole milk 
and then combining the resulting “skimmed milk” with vegetable oil so 
it tastes like whole milk.68  Congress heard testimony about the 
scientifically-proven health benefits of milk fat in our diet.69  But some 
thirty-four years later in 1972, in a little-known development, the Filled 
Milk Act was actually held unconstitutional as applied to the Milnot 
Company—the successor to the Carolene Products Company—by 
Federal District Court Judge Robert Morgan, who wrote that “[w]hile 
Congress may select a particular evil and regulate it to the exclusion of 
other possible evils in the same industry, any distinction drawn must at 
least be rational.”70 
Judge Morgan wrote that “[a]ssuming that the factual basis for the 
Filled Milk Act now does require review, the court is not at liberty to 
shut its eyes to a possible constitutional infirmity out of deference to 
Congress, when the validity of the law depends upon the truth of what is 
declared.”71  Denying that it may sit “as a ‘super legislature,’ weighing 
the wisdom, need, or general appropriateness of legislative policy,” the 
court recognized that it “must consider the possible violation of due 
process of law in existing declared policy.”72  Judge Morgan then 
paraphrased the passages from the text (not the footnote) of Carolene 
Products I highlighted above:  “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary 
                                                 
65 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
66 Id. at 153 (citation omitted). 
67 Id. at 153–54. 
68 Id. at 149 n.2. 
69 Id. at 148.  I refer to Carolene Products as the “Milk Fat Case.” 
70 Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221, 224 (S.D. Ill. 1972) (emphasis added). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
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commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless, 
in light of the known facts, it is of such a character as to preclude the 
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge 
and experience of the legislators” and that “the constitutionality of a 
statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be 
challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to 
exist.”73 
Applying this standard to the undisputed facts in the record, the 
court found that: 
it appears crystal clear that certain imitation milk and 
dairy products are so similar to Milnot in composition, 
appearance, and use that different treatment as to 
interstate shipment caused by application of the Filled 
Milk Act to Milnot violates the due process of law to 
which Milnot Company is constitutionally entitled.74 
Whatever previous “dairy market conditions and dangers of confusion 
[had] led to the passage and judicial upholding of the Filled Milk Act 
many years ago,” the court found that these “have long since ceased to 
exist.”75 
Although he accepted the proposition that the “equal protection of 
the laws does not require identical treatment among those similarly 
situated,” Judge Morgan nevertheless found that “it does require that 
arbitrary or capricious distinctions not be made.”76  For this proposition 
he cited Wickard v. Filburn.77  The fact that “at least six other food 
products now moving in interstate commerce have almost identical 
appearance and consistency to milk (or evaporated milk) and to each 
other, both in the package and when poured,” yielded a “conclusion that 
                                                 
73 Id. (citing Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152; Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 
(1924)). 
74 Id. 
75 Id.  In  footnote one, Judge Moran then observed: 
It is not insignificant in this regard that some eleven states which 
passed filled milk acts have since discarded them—five by repeal and 
six by court action.  By far, the majority of states now permit 
wholesome and properly labeled filled milk products.  It is worth 
noting, also, that when the Federal Filled Milk Act was passed by 
Congress and upheld by the Supreme Court, the presently accepted 
dangers of “cholesterol” in animal fat were almost unknown. 
Id. at 224 n.1. 
76 Id. at 225 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942)). 
77 Id. 
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an act which produces such incongruous results regarding interstate 
shipment alone is devoid of rationality.”78  Judge Moran continued: 
The possibility of confusion, or passing off, in the 
marketplace, which justified the statute in 1944, can no 
longer be used rationally as a constitutional prop to 
prevent interstate shipment of Milnot.  There is at least 
as much danger in this regard with imitation milk as 
with filled milk, and actually no longer any such real 
danger with either.79 
For all these reasons, the court found that “[p]revention of confusion 
in the market, however valid in 1944, [wa]s no longer a valid basis to 
sustain the Filled Milk Act, and thus to prevent only the interstate 
shipment of Milnot (or any other product of milk which is exactly like 
it).”80  Therefore, the court concluded “as a matter of law, that the Filled 
Milk Act, as applied to prohibit interstate shipment of Milnot, deprives 
the plaintiff of due process of law and provides no rational means for the 
achievement of any announced objective of the Act.”81 
In short, the Milnot Company was allowed to bring evidence into 
court to show the irrationality of the Filled Milk Act—evidence which 
the court would then evaluate as an independent tribunal of justice.  
Judge Morgan then ordered that the company was free to market Milnot 
“in interstate and foreign commerce, free from any prosecution or other 
interference from defendant for violation of the Filled Milk Act.”82  The 
government declined to appeal to the circuit court. 
Although Judge Morgan’s opinion was true to the Court’s decision 
in Carolene Products, which it cited, it failed to cite the more recent 1955 
decision of Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, in which Justice 
Douglass’s majority opinion reversed the lower court’s considered 
judgment that a law banning opticians from providing certain eye glass 
services in competition with ophthalmologists and optometrists was 
irrationally discriminatory.83  Instead of a realistic judicial examination of 
the facts, as the Supreme Court in Carolene Products had previously 
insisted was required to satisfy due process, Justice Douglass’s opinion 





82 Id. at 226. 
83 348 U.S. 483, 485–86, 491 (1955). 
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accepted any hypothetical or imagined basis a legislature might have 
had for restricting liberty.84 
Like Judge Morgan’s opinion in Milnot, the lengthy lower court 
opinion in Lee Optical of Oklahoma v. Williamson provides an example of a 
realistic judicial inquiry into the rationality of a restriction on liberty.85  
Although the three-judge panel court applied a presumption of 
constitutionality, it allowed the Lee Optical Company to show that it was 
irrational and arbitrary to prohibit opticians from providing some of the 
same services as ophthalmologists and optometrists.86  For example, if 
you broke your glasses and went to an ophthalmologist, he would hand 
them to his technician to use a Lensometer to read off the prescription—
exactly what an optician does.87  Such a lens replacement service simply 
did not require the training of a medical doctor.88 
In Restoring the Lost Constitution, I proposed reversing the 
presumption of constitutionality in favor of a presumption of liberty that 
would place the burden on the government to justify its restriction of 
liberty.89  However, these opinions show that who bears the formal 
burden of proof is less important than the recognition that laws must be 
realistically assessed for rationality, even if the legislature is given the 
benefit of the doubt.  After all, the lower courts in the Williamson and 
Milnot cases dutifully applied a presumption of constitutionality placing 
the burden on the affected companies to establish the irrationality of the 
law.90  What was important was that the individual citizen, or here a 
company, was allowed to meet this burden. 
Nevertheless, the individual conception of popular sovereignty 
identified here supports a presumption in favor of the people.  Not only 
does the Ninth Amendment imply that the “rights . . . retained by the 
people” not be “den[ied] or disparage[d],” but the Tenth Amendment 
reserves “to the people” all powers not delegated to the federal or state 
                                                 
84 See id. at 490 (suggesting possible conclusions on which the legislature could have 
relied that would create a legitimate basis to uphold the restriction). 
85 See generally 120 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Okla. 1954), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 348 U.S. 483 
(1955) (holding certain provisions of an Oklahoma visual care statute unconstitutional). 
86 Compare id. at 132 (“It is recognized, without citation of authority, that all legislative 
enactments are accompanied by a presumption of constitutionality . . . .”), with id. at 139 
(finding no real difference between ready-to-wear spectacles and prescription glasses; 
therefore, finding a statute unreasonable that regulated one but not the other). 
87 See id. at 137 (stating that an office clerk operates the Lensometer and not the 
physician). 
88 See Randy E. Barnett, Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee Optical, 19 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 845, 853–55 (2012) (describing in detail the lower court’s reasoning). 
89 BARNETT, supra note 3, at 253–54, 260. 
90 See supra text accompanying notes 73, 86 (discussing how the Williamson and Milnot 
courts applied a presumption of constitutionality). 
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governments.91  Both these textual affirmations of popular sovereignty 
suggest that it is “the people” as individuals, not their agents, who 
deserve the benefit of the doubt.  If the government really has a 
legitimate justification for restricting the liberties of the people, it ought 
to be able to sustain the burden of defending its justification to a neutral 
tribunal without any judicial thumb placed on the scale in its favor.92 
Before concluding, let me summarize the analysis I have presented 
here: 
1. Because the people are sovereign, in the absence of their express 
consent, there must be assurance that laws restricting their 
liberties are within the power of a legislature to enact. 
2. Laws that irrationally or arbitrarily restrict the rights retained by 
the people are not within the legislative power because no 
rational person can be supposed to have consented to their 
liberty being arbitrarily restricted. 
3. Legislators cannot be the judges in their own case when a citizen 
claims that a law restricting his or her liberty is irrational, 
arbitrary, or discriminatory. 
4. The due process of law affords each person the opportunity to 
contest the rationality of a restriction of his or her liberty before 
an independent tribunal of justice. 
5. This conception of due process differs from modern “substantive 
due process” doctrine that gives heightened protection—
perhaps even strict scrutiny—to a select few rights that judges 
deem to be fundamental.  Instead, any restriction of liberty is 
unconstitutional if it is shown to be irrational, arbitrary, or 
discriminatory. 
6. In our constitutional system, judges have a duty to scrutinize 
legislation to ensure that it is within the proper power of the 
legislature to enact.93 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The conception of individual popular sovereignty advocated by 
James Wilson and John Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia, resolves the tension 
                                                 
91 U.S. CONST. amend. IX; U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
92 See CLARK M. NEILY III, TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT:  HOW OUR COURTS SHOULD ENFORCE 
THE CONSTITUTION’S PROMISE OF LIMITED GOVERNMENT 2 (2013) (indicating that the 
government needs a valid reason to restrict people’s freedom and that the judiciary should 
not favor the government’s position). 
93 See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008) (describing the origin 
and development of the judicial duty—as opposed to a judicial “power”—to invalidate or 
nullify unconstitutional statutes). 
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between “the consent of the governed” and the natural and inalienable 
rights of each person.  According to the collectivist conception of popular 
sovereignty, by necessity, the will of the majority of the people, or even a 
majority of a group of legislators can “consent” to restricting everyone’s 
liberties.  In contrast, under an individualist conception of popular 
sovereignty, the “consent of the governed” requires the consent of each 
and every person.  Because, however, such consent can only be 
presumed, every restriction on one’s life, liberty, or property must be 
assessed by an independent tribunal of justice to ensure these restrictions 
are really aimed at serving what Locke called “the common good.” 
In this way, the Declaration’s affirmation that “to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men” can be reconciled with its claim 
that these “just powers” are “deriv[ed] . . . from the consent of the 
governed.”94  If we are realistic about this consent, then a government 
lacking the express consent of each person is illegitimate unless “the due 
process of law” includes effective assurances that it does not exercise 
powers that violate the rights retained by the people.  Such assurances 
require judicial engagement to identify when the restrictions on the 
liberties of the individual are irrational, arbitrary, or discriminatory.  For 
this reason, judges have a constitutional duty to scrutinize legislation. 
                                                 
94 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 1, at para. 2. 
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